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Supplemental Figures 
 
 
Figure S1 – related to Figure 1: BDM auction task, control experiment, and stability of the 
preference and social conformity 
(A) Timeline of one trial in the BDM auction task. Participants were asked to make self-paced 
bids for 40 items. The 40 items were presented in random order. On each trial, they made a 
bid for the item by moving a red cursor. The initial position of the cursor was randomly 
chosen in each trial. RT, reaction time; ITI, inter-trial-interval. 
(B) Distributions of the preference for each of the 40 items (mean ± SEM across participants; 
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n = 20; Top, the main experiment; Bottom, the control experiment). 
(C) Choices of the human not-scanned participants in the main experiment and those of the 
computer algorithms in the control experiment. Red, four-person blocks; Blue, six-person 
blocks. Filled circles, human participants’ choice behaviors in the main experiment; Open 
circles, computer algorithms’ choice behaviors in the control experiment. Top, probabilities 
of following the majority’s prior choice (mean ± SD across participants) as a function of 
the number of participants/algorithms in the majority side. “4:2”, for example, means that 
the majority contains four while the minority has two participants. Bottom, durations of the 
ISI phase, i.e., the other participants/algorithms’ reaction time and a jittered interval (mean ± 25%-75% quantiles). ISI, inter-stimulus-interval. 
(D) Changes of the preference during the experiment. Differences in the preference between 
pre- and post-scanning BDM auction task are plotted for each category of items (mean ± 
SEM across participants; Top, the main experiment; Bottom, the control experiment). 
Consensus, items on which participants reached a consensus; No-consensus, items on 
which participants did not reach a consensus. n.s., non-significant as p > 0.05. 
(E) Changes of the preference during the experiment when participants reached a consensus on 
the non-preferred item by compromise. Consensus, consensus/non-preferred items. 
No-consensus, no-consensus/preferred items paired with the consensus items. The format is 
the same for panel D. 
(F) Across-participants correlation between the weight for the group members’ prior choice and 
the social conformity effect (i.e., degree of the preference change shown in panel E). The 
correlation coefficients were not significant (consensus items in the main experiment: r = 
0.16, p = 0.51, two-tailed; no-consensus items in the main experiment: r = -0.04, p = 0.88, 
two-tailed; consensus items in the control experiment: r = -0.08, p = 0.75, two-tailed; 
no-consensus items in the control experiment: r = -0.18, p = 0.46, two-tailed). 
(G) Behavioral fits of computational models including the social conformity model. Left, the 
main experiment; Right, the control experiment. BIC, Bayesian information criterion (the 
smaller the value, the better the model fit). The format is the same for Figure 3G.  
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Figure S2 – related to Figure 2: Behavioral results of the not-scanned participants in the 
main experiment 
(A) Participants’ choices on the first trials in each block. The format is the same for Figure 2B. 
(B) Participants’ choices on the second and later trials in each block. The format is the same for 
Figure 2C. 
(C) Computational models’ fit to participants’ choices. Each model was separately fitted to each 
individual participant’s choice behavior (i.e., individual modeling approach in Figure S4B), 
and then each model’s goodness-of-fit was compared by using Bayesian Model Selection 
(BMS) (Stephan et al., 2009). Each bar denotes exceedance probability in BMS (the 
probability that a model is more likely than the other models; larger values closer to one 
indicate better fit). The format is the same for Figure S4E. 
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Figure S3 – related to Figure 4: Correlation between key computational variables and the 
behavioral weights for the variables 
(A) Trial-by-trial cross correlation of the three computational variables (i.e., regressors of 
interest in our fMRI regression analysis). Preference (P), preference value of the chosen 
item; Group members’ prior choice (G), percentage of group-members who had previously 
selected the item that was chosen by the participant on the current trial; Stickiness (S), 
estimated stickiness of the chosen item. 
(B) Across-participants cross correlation of the behavioral weights for the individual key 
computational variables. 
(C) Probability distributions of the individual behavioral weights estimated by the hierarchical 
modeling approach in Figure S4A. Each gray dot denotes each participant’s behavioral 
weight for the corresponding variable. 
(D) Main vs. control experiments: behavioral weight for the group-members’ prior choice. Left, 
probability distributions of the behavioral weight (solid line, the main experiment; dashed 
line, the control experiment). Right, distribution of the difference in the weight between the 
main and the control experiment. 
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Figure S4 – related to Figure 3: Computational models’ fit 
(A) Graphical illustration of the hierarchical modeling approach to model fitting (Daw, 2011). 
Each participant’s individual-level parameters, w1, w2 and w3, are drawn from common 
population-level normal distributions. 
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(B) Illustration of the individual modeling approach to model fitting. Individual-level 
parameters are separately estimated for each participant. 
(C) Computational models’ fit based on the hierarchical modeling approach separately for early 
and late blocks. Top, the main experiment; Bottom, the control experiment. Left, all blocks; 
Middle, early blocks; Right, late blocks. BIC, Bayesian information criterion (smaller 
values indicate better fit). The format is the same for Figure 3G. 
(D) Computational models’ fit based on the hierarchical modeling approach separately for 
four-person and six-person blocks. Left, four-person blocks; Right, six-person blocks. The 
format is the same for Figure 3G. 
(E) Computational models’ fit based on the individual modeling approach. Left, the main 
experiment; Right, the control experiment. Each bar denotes the exceedance probability (the 
probability that a model is more likely than the other models; larger values closer to one 
indicate better fit) in Bayesian Model Selection (Stephan et al., 2009). 
  
Supplemental Information: Human consensus decision-making 
 
Supplemental Tables 
 
 
Table S1 – related to Figure 5: Activated clusters observed in the whole-brain analysis (p < 
0.05, corrected at cluster level) for the main and the control experiment. The stereotaxic 
coordinates are in accordance with MNI space. t-statistics, uncorrected p-values at the peak of 
each locus are shown. In the far right column, the number of voxels in each cluster is shown. 
The region of interest discussed in the main text is shown in bold. pSTS, posterior superior 
temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; Hemi, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area. 
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Table S2 – related to Figure 6: Activated clusters observed in the whole-brain analysis (p < 
0.05, corrected at cluster level) for the main and the control experiment. The format is the same 
for Table S1. IPS, left intraparietal sulcus; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Hemi, 
hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area. 
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Participants 
In our main experiment, 120 healthy, normal volunteers (48 females; age range 
18-38 years; mean ± SD, 22.11 ± 4.61) participated. Twenty out of the 120 participants (10 
females; age range 19-38 years; mean ± SD, 28.40 ± 5.03) were scanned with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), while they performed an experimental task (see below). 
The remaining 100 participants were engaged in the same task outside the MRI scanner.  
A control experiment involved 20 normal volunteers (9 females; age range, 20-39 
years; mean, 27.75 ± 5.67 years) who did not participate in the main experiment. Importantly, 
the participants in the control experiment matched those who were scanned in the main 
experiment in terms of mean age (p > 0.7, two-tailed t-test), gender ratio (p > 0.9, two-tailed, 
Fisher's exact test), handedness ratio (p > 0.9, two-tailed, Fisher's exact test), hunger-rating 
score (p > 0.1, two-tailed t-test), education level (p > 0.5, two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank sum test), 
income level (p > 0.1, two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank sum test), Baron-Cohen Autism Quotient scale 
(Wheelwright et al., 2006) (p > 0.9, two-tailed t-test), degree of risk-aversion (p > 0.4, 
two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank sum test) and loss-aversion (p > 0.1, two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank sum 
test), Full-Scale IQ (p > 0.6, two-tailed t-test), and self-reported sociality scales (Russell and 
Karol, 2002) such as size of the social network, social-boldness, social-sensitivity, 
social-adjustment, social-control and social-expressivity (p > 0.2 for all the comparisons, 
two-tailed t-test). 
All participants were pre-assessed to exclude those with a special diet, allergies to 
the type of foods used in the experiment or any previous history of neurological/psychiatric 
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illness, and they gave their informed written consent. The study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
Stimuli 
 In our experiments, participants evaluated and made choices with 20 snack food 
items (e.g. chips and chocolate bars) and 20 non-food items, termed “trinkets” (e.g. Caltech 
memorabilia, DVDs and books). These items were highly familiar and available at campus and 
local stores, and mostly overlapped with those used in the previous study (Chib et al., 2009). All 
items were presented to participants as high-resolution color images (72 dpi).  
Experimental Tasks 
Participants performed three tasks: pre-scanning BDM auction task, consensus 
decision-making task, and post-scanning BDM auction task.  
In the main experiment, six participants came to the Caltech Social Science 
Experimental Laboratory, SSEL (Pasadena, CA). In SSEL each participant was separated by a 
partition and was not allowed to make any verbal or gestural communication with other 
participants. The participants were taken through the experimental instructions together and 
then engaged in the pre-scanning BDM auction task. After that, one participant moved to the 
Caltech Brain Imaging Center, CBIC (Pasadena, CA), and performed the consensus 
decision-making task inside the MRI scanner, while the remaining five participants performed 
the same task at SSEL (CBIC and SSEL were interconnected via intranet). Finally, they were 
engaged in the post-scanning BDM auction task at SSEL. On the other hand, in the control 
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experiment, each participant never met any other participants and performed the three tasks 
individually. 
Notably, to enhance participants’ motivation to food items, we asked them to refrain 
from eating or drinking any liquids, besides water, for three hours before the experiment. 
Furthermore, they were asked to stay at SSEL for 30 min after the experiment, during which 
time the only thing they were able to eat was the snack obtained in the experiment. 
Pre- and Post-scanning BDM auction task. We measured participants’ preference for each of 
the 40 items by using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschack (BDM) auction (Becker et al., 1964). We 
followed the experimental procedure used in Chib et al. (2009). In the BDM auction task, 
participants were asked to make self-paced bids, ranging from $0 to $4, for 40 items (see Figure 
S1AB and Chib et al. (2009) for details). The auction mechanism has been mathematically 
proven to be incentive compatible in a sense that the optimal strategy for the participants is to 
always bid the number closest to their true willingness to pay for obtaining that item (Becker et 
al., 1964). The optimal strategy was explicitly instructed to participants, and by using a 
questionnaire we confirmed that they correctly understood the experimental mechanism. In the 
present study, we refer to the amount of bid (i.e., willingness to pay) as “preference” for the 
item.  
Consensus decision-making task. In the main experiment, each participant tried to build a 
consensus with other participants on a choice between two items (Figure 1A). The task 
consisted of 40 blocks of trials (Figure 1BC): 20 six-person and 20 four-person blocks. The 
six-person blocks involved all six of the participants (one scanned and five not-scanned), while 
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the four-person blocks involved four participants (one scanned and three not-scanned selected 
randomly from the five). In conducting the experiment, we ran four fMRI scanning sessions, 
each of which had five four-person and five six-person blocks in a random order. 
In each block of trials, participants simultaneously chose between two items 
repeatedly until they reached a consensus, i.e., choosing the same item (Figure 1BC). If they 
reached a consensus on a trial, they got the item and moved to the next block; otherwise they 
moved to the next trial in the same block and made another choice between the same pair of the 
items. If they did not reach consensus before the end of the block, they did not get anything and 
moved to the next block (e.g. Block 3 in Figure 1C). In the next block, participants made 
choices between a different pair of the items repeatedly, again, until they reached a consensus. 
Pairs of items were pseudo-randomly assigned so that the same pair was never presented again; 
that each item was selected only twice; and that a snack (trinket) item was always paired with 
another snack (trinket). Importantly, the maximum number of trials in each block was not 
instructed to participants, and in actuality was determined stochastically, as follows: if after 10 
trials consensus was not yet reached, subsequent trials were triggered with a probability of 0.75, 
or the block was terminated with a probability of 0.25. The probability that the maximum 
number of trials is k is therefore, 𝑃 𝑘 = 0                                                  if  𝑘 < 101 − 𝑝 !!!"𝑝      if  𝑘 ≥ 10   
where p = 0.25. Thus after a minimum block length of 10 trials, additional trials could be 
triggered randomly until such a consensus was reached, or the block ended. This feature of the 
design is important because it means that the participants therefore cannot easily exploit 
knowledge about how many trials would be left in a block and thus cannot use this information 
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to alter their strategy accordingly. 
At the beginning of each trial, each participant was asked to make a choice between 
the pair of items by pressing a button with their right hand (index finger for the left item; and 
middle finger for the right) with no time constraint (Decision phase; Figure 1B). The two items 
were randomly positioned left or right of the fixation point in every trial. The chosen item was 
immediately highlighted by a gray frame, initiating the ISI (inter-stimulus-interval) phase. After 
a waiting time for the other group-members’ decisions and a jittered interval (1.5-4.5s), the 
others’ choices were revealed to the participant by red dots (Outcome phase, 2s). Notably, 
participants were not able to identify each of the other group members; they were informed only 
about the distribution of the red dots (i.e., the number of participants choosing each of the two 
items). If all the dots were located below the image of the item the participant had chosen, i.e., 
consensus, the participant was informed that she/he obtained the item (Instruction phase, 3s) 
and moved to the next block after the jittered ITI (2-6s). Otherwise, Decision phase on the next 
trial in the same block was initiated following the ITI. 
In the control experiment, settings were almost the same as those in the main experiment, except 
for that each participant tried to build a consensus with computer algorithms instead of other 
human participants. In this experiment, the instructions were carefully designed in order to 
make the task as “impersonal” as possible so as to avoid participants attributing agency to the 
computer algorithms. We thus did not use any suggestion of human-likeness in the computer 
algorithms. Specifically, we instructed to participants, “You will get the item if all the red dots 
are located below the image of the item you choose within one block of trials. Otherwise, you 
will get nothing … At the initial trial in a block, the placement of each dot under a particular 
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item is determined randomly by the computer. On subsequent trials, it is possible that a dot will 
switch position from one item to the other. The probability of an individual dot moving from one 
item to the other depends on where the other dots are located, and the choice you yourself 
make”. In actuality, the computer algorithm to determine the location of each red dot was 
designed to mimic the not-scanned participants’ actual choice behavior in the main experiment, 
both in terms of the tendency to follow the majority’s choice and reaction times (Figure S1C).   
Reward payment  
Participants received a participation fee of $60. Furthermore, at the end of the 
experiment we created a pool for the participant’s choices of all the three tasks. The computer 
selected one choice at random from the pool, and the selected choice was actually implemented. 
The specific process was as follows: (i) the computer randomly selected pre-, post-scanning 
BDM auction task or Consensus decision-making task; (ii) if pre- or post-scanning BDM 
auction task was selected, one trial in the task was selected at random and actually 
implemented; (iii) if Consensus decision-making task was selected, one block in the task was 
selected at random. If the participant reached a consensus with the other group-members in the 
block, she/he got the item; otherwise, she/he did not get anything. Since participants did not 
know which choice was selected, they should have treated every choice as if it were the only 
one. Also note that for this reason they did not need to consider the possibility of receiving the 
same item twice. 
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Computational models  
To determine the key computational variables involved in the Consensus 
decision-making task, we constructed a family of computational models and fit those models to 
the participants’ actual choice behaviors.  
Full model. A decision value for one item, say A, is constructed by  
 𝑄 𝐴 = 𝑤!𝑃 𝐴 + 𝑤!𝐺 𝐴 + 𝑤!𝑆 𝐴 ,    (1) 
where 𝑃(𝐴) is the participant’s preference for A, 𝐺(𝐴) is the percentage of group-members 
who chose A on the previous trial, 𝑆(𝐴) is the estimated stickiness of A (see below for the 
derivation), and 𝑤!, 𝑤! and 𝑤! denote the decision weights for the three variables. The value 
for the other item, B, is similarly constructed. The decision values govern the participant’s 
choice probability (of the item A) as follows: 
 𝑞 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑄 𝐴 − 𝑄(𝐵)) 
     = 𝑓(𝑤!(𝑃 𝐴 − 𝑃(𝐵)) + 𝑤!(𝐺 𝐴 − 𝐺(𝐵)) + 𝑤!(𝑆 𝐴 − 𝑆(𝐵))),  (2) 
where 𝑓 𝑧 = 1 [1 + exp  (−z)] is a sigmoidal function. 
 The hidden stickiness is inferred by a simple Bayesian learning algorithm (see Figure 
3A for the graphical description of the inference). The Bayesian-learner estimates the hidden 
variable, S, from observable variables: the others’ choices on the current trial, Y, and the group 
members’ choices on the previous trial, G. Here, let’s assume the stickiness, S, reflects the 
others’ aggregated preference for each item without loss of generality. That is, the stickiness of 
an item results from the others’ strong preference for the item. Precisely, 𝑆 𝐴  reflects the 
others’ aggregated relative preference for A, 𝑃!(𝐴) ≡ 𝑃! 𝐴 − 𝑃!(𝐵) where 𝑃! denotes the 
others’ preference for each item. Likewise, 𝑆 𝐵  reflects 𝑃!(𝐵) ≡ 𝑃! 𝐵 − 𝑃!(𝐴), and so 
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𝑃! 𝐵 = −𝑃!(𝐴). Then, the Bayesian-learner’s goal is to update estimates of the others’ 
aggregated relative preference, 𝑃!, from their current choices, Y, and the group-members’ prior 
choices, G, 
 𝑝! 𝑃! ∝ 𝑝 𝑃!   𝑝 𝑌 𝑃! ,𝐺 .          (3) 
Note that a variable the Bayesian-learner estimates is the “aggregated” preference because in 
our task participants could not identify each of the other group-members. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that the estimated variable is the “relative” preference, as inference about the 
absolute preference participants have for each item is unlikely to be determinable from the 
choice data. 
Assuming the Bayesian-learner believes that the others’ choices Y are generated by 
their own preference 𝑃! and the group members’ prior choice G, likelihood of Y given 𝑃! and 
G can be computed as a product of the others’ choice probabilities, 
  𝑝 𝑌 𝑃! ,𝐺 = 𝑞 𝐴 𝑃! ,𝐺 !!   𝑞 𝐵 𝑃! ,𝐺 !! 
 = 𝑓(𝑤!𝑃!(𝐴) + 𝑤!(𝐺 𝐴 − 𝐺(𝐵)))!!   × 
  𝑓(𝑤!𝑃! 𝐵 + 𝑤!(𝐺 𝐵 − 𝐺(𝐴)))!!,  (4) 
where 𝑀! and 𝑀! represent the number of others who choose A and B respectively (𝑀! + 𝑀! = M – 1; M is a group size, four for four-person blocks and six for six-person blocks), and f 
is a sigmoidal function (as in equation (2)). The assumption about the learner’s belief is 
reasonable, given that as shown in Figure 2C participants’ choices were actually guided by their 
own preference and the group-members’ prior choice in this task. 
On the first trial in each block, the Bayesian learner has a normally distributed prior 
belief about the others’ aggregated relative preference. This prior belief has the basis on the 
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assumption that the learner believes each of the others’ relative preference is uniformly 
distributed in [$-4, $4] and so the aggregate preference over the M – 1 other group-members is, 
by the central limit theorem, approximately normally-distributed with mean zero and variance 
64/ 12(𝑀 − 1) . 
In this paper, we term the expectation of the others’ aggregated relative preference as 
stickiness, i.e., 𝑆 𝐴 ≡ 𝑃! 𝐴 𝑝 𝑃! 𝐴 𝑑𝑃! 𝐴 . Participants utilize the estimated stickiness, 
S, at the time of decision to make a choice (see equation (1)). 
To fit the model to the participants’ actual choices, we employed a hierarchical 
modeling approach (Figure S4A) (Daw, 2011). In this approach, each participant’s 
individual-level decision parameters are assumed to be drawn from common population-level 
normal distributions: for participant i, 𝑤!(!)~𝑁(𝜇!,𝜎!), 𝑤!(!)~𝑁(𝜇!,𝜎!) and 𝑤!(!)~𝑁(𝜇!,𝜎!). 
Then, the likelihood of the participant i’s choices is, 
𝑝 𝒄!|𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!
= 𝑝 𝒄!|𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!) 𝑝 𝑤!(!)|𝜇!,𝜎! 𝑝 𝑤!(!)|𝜇!,𝜎! 𝑝 𝑤!(!)|𝜇!,𝜎! 𝑑𝑤!(!)𝑑𝑤!(!)𝑑𝑤!(!) 
(5) 
where 𝑝 𝒄!|𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!)  can be derived by equation (2). The likelihood of the full choice 
data set from all participants (1,…,N) is simply a product over the participants: 
 𝑝 𝒄!⋯ 𝒄!|𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎! = 𝑝 𝒄!|𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!!!!! .      (6) 
We estimated the population-level parameters using Maximum likelihood estimation of 
equation (6) (minimizing the negative log likelihood, − log 𝑝 𝒄!⋯ 𝒄!|𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎! , by 
using fminsearch in Matlab R2013b, MathWorks). For model comparisons (Figure 3G, and 
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Figures S1G and S4CD), the obtained negative log likelihood was converted to Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) that takes into account the numbers of free parameters (smaller 
values indicate better fit). 
Once the population parameters are determined, we can recover the distribution of 
each participant’s individual-level parameters as follows: 
     𝑝 𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!) ∝ 𝑝 𝒄!|𝑤!! ,𝑤!! ,𝑤!! 𝑝 𝑤!! ,𝑤!! ,𝑤!! |𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎!, 𝜇!,𝜎! .  (7) 
Then, the expected value of each parameter can be derived by, e.g., for 𝑤!(!),  
    𝑤!(!) = 𝑤!(!) 𝑝 𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!),𝑤!(!) 𝑑𝑤!(!)𝑑𝑤!(!) 𝑑𝑤!(!).                          (8) 
We used the expected values of 𝑤!(!), 𝑤!(!) and 𝑤!(!) as each participant’s decision weights for 
the three computational variables in the behavioral and fMRI analyses. 
In a supplemental analysis, we also employed an individual modeling approach 
(Figure S4B) in which the individual-level parameters are estimated for each individual 
participant separately without the hierarchical structure. In this analysis, each model’s goodness 
of fit was assessed by Model evidence (approximated by BIC (Daw, 2011)) and then entered 
into a Bayesian model selection procedure (BMS) (Stephan et al., 2009) for the model 
comparisons (Figures S2C and S4E). 
Alternative partial models. We also implemented a family of partial models that included only 
one or two of the three decision variables used in the full model above to compute the decision 
value (a separate model was implemented to capture each possible combination of decision 
variables). For example, a model named “P + G” in Figure 3G constructs a decision value based 
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only on the participant’s own preference and the group members’ prior choice, i.e., 𝑄 𝐴 =𝑤!𝑃 𝐴 + 𝑤!𝐺 𝐴 . 
Additional alternative models. We also considered some variants of the P + G model, in which 
the decision weight for the group-members’ prior choice, w2, is modulated trial-by-trial, as 
proposed by a theoretical study (Couzin et al., 2005). 
In a model, named “P + Gmodulated I” in Figure S4, the weight is updated as proposed in (Couzin 
et al., 2005): 
 𝑤!,!!! = 𝑤!,! + 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝐶 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑤!,! − 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝐶 ≠ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚,                     (9) 
where C denotes an item chosen by the participant on the trial t. Here, the initial weight and the 
increment 𝜂 are individual-level free-parameters. 
In another model, named “P + Gmodulated II” in Figure S4, 
 𝑤!,!!! = 𝑤!,! + 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝐶 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!𝑠  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑤!,! − 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝐶 ≠ 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!𝑠  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒.                (10) 
In the other model, named “P + Gmodulated III” in Figure S4,  
 𝑤!,!!! = 𝑤!,! + 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!𝑠  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑤!,! − 𝜂        𝑖𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 ≠ 𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!𝑠  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒.    (11) 
 Furthermore, we considered another alternative model, named “P x G” in Figure S4, 
that constructs a decision value based on the expected reward of the item, i.e., preference value 
multiplied by the likelihood of consensus on the item. Assuming that the likelihood is 
approximated with the percentage of other group-members’ who chose the item on the previous 
trial, 𝐺!, a decision value can be represented by 𝑄 𝐴 = 𝑤!𝑃 𝐴 !   ×  𝐺! 𝐴 , where α governs 
the participant’s risk-preference. 
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Social conformity model. We constructed a model reflecting social conformity effects that 
conflict between participants’ own preference and observed group members’ choice alters their 
preference. In this model, when participants’ preference is incongruent with the majority’s 
choice, their preference is updated in proportion to the percentage of group-members’ who 
chose the item on the current trial. That is, 
 𝑃!!! 𝐴 = 𝑃! 𝐴 + 𝜂 𝐺! 𝐴 − 50 , 
where the learning rate 𝜂 is an individual-level free-parameter and the updated preference 
carry over across blocks (preference for the other item, B, is similarly updated). A decision 
value at trial t + 1 is thus computed as 𝑄!!! 𝐴 = 𝑤!𝑃!!! 𝐴 . 
Additional behavioral analyses 
Stability of preferences and effects of social conformity. We checked if participants’ 
preference for each item was altered during the experiment. Contrasting the preference 
measured before and after the experiment, we found the participants’ preference was overall 
quite stable (Figure S1D). There was no significant change (p > 0.40, two-tailed, for all items) 
irrespective of item categories (p > 0.9, two-tailed, for foods; and p > 0.4, two-tailed, for 
trinkets) or if they reached consensus on the item or not (p > 0.1, two-tailed, for consensus 
items; and p > 0.7, two-tailed, for no-consensus items).  
A closer examination, however, revealed a small but significant change in the 
participants’ preference in a manner consistent with previous studies on social conformity 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Charpentier et al., 2014; Klucharev et al., 2009). When 
participants reached a consensus on the non-preferred item by compromise, their preference for 
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the consensus/non-preferred item increased while that for the paired no-consensus/preferred 
item decreased (Figure S1E), implying that conflict between participants’ own preference and 
observed group members’ choice altered their preference (Izuma, 2013). Here, it is worth noting 
that the preference change is unlikely to be strongly confounded with the effect of group 
members’ prior choices in our model. This is because there was no significant correlation 
between the social conformity effect (degree of the preference change) and the weight of the 
group-members’ prior choices estimated by the model fitting (p > 0.4, two-tailed, for all cases; 
Figure S1F). Thus, the effects of social conformity on preference and strategic consideration of 
group members’ prior choices are two distinct effects. Moreover, the social conformity account 
has little explanatory power to predict participants’ actual choice behavior in our experiment. 
To test this, we constructed a computational model reflecting purely social conformity effects, 
but without any strategic components (see Social conformity model), and compared the 
goodness of fit with our other models that do incorporate strategic considerations as described 
in the previous section. Formal model comparison showed the social conformity model 
provided a worse fit compared to the other models (Figure S1G). Taken together, although there 
is a slight effect of social conformity on individual preferences in the study, social conformity 
effects per se do not appear to be playing a major role in explaining participants’ choice 
behavior. 
Individual behavior in the main experiment: additional alternative explanations. In this 
experiment, participants in principle could employ more complicated strategies. One possibility 
might be that participants learned some aspects of the task-structure or about others’ preferences 
across blocks, which would result in a decrease in the number of trials taken to reach consensus 
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in late blocks. Another possibility might be that participants engaged in temporal 
coordination/collusion. An example of this in the context of our experiment would be if 
participants reached a consensus on the item that was preferred by one participant, and then in 
the next block they reached a consensus on the item preferred by another participant. This type 
of temporal coordination, so-called “alternating reciprocity”, has been observed in previous 
studies of two-person battle of sexes games (Rapoport et al., 1976; Sonsino and Sirota, 2003). 
We reasoned that if it was the case in our experiment, a sequence of whether the participant won 
or lost (win: consensus on the preferred item; lose: otherwise) would exhibit an oscillatory 
pattern at least to some degree. 
To examine these possibilities, we looked into the temporal property of the number 
of trials and sequences of wins/losses. Inconsistent with the possibility that participants adopted 
complicated strategies, we did not find any significant temporal-trends in the number of trials 
(ANOVA, p > 0.4; Jonckheere’s trend test on the individual participant level, p < 0.05, 
two-tailed, only in two of the 20 participants) or auto-correlations in the sequence of wins/losses 
(r = 0.047 ± 0.040, p > 0.25, two-tailed; on the individual participant level, p < 0.05, 
two-tailed, only in one of the 20 participants). Moreover, it is worth noting that in this 
experiment the same pair of items was never presented again; and that each participant couldn’t 
uniquely identify each of the other individuals (see Experimental Tasks). Given these features 
of the experiment, as well as the results of the additional analyses, we believe that it is unlikely 
that participants utilized these complex strategies. 
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fMRI Data Acquisition 
The fMRI images were collected using a 3T Siemens (Erlangen) Trio scanner located 
at the Caltech Brain Imaging Center (Pasadena, CA) with a 32-channel radio frequency coil. 
The BOLD signal was measured using a one-shot T2*-weighted echo planar imaging sequence 
(Volume TR = 2780 ms, TE = 30 ms, FA = 80°). Forty-four oblique slices (thickness = 3.0 mm, 
gap = 0 mm, FOV = 192 × 192 mm, matrix = 64 × 64) were acquired per volume. The slices 
were aligned 30° to the AC–PC plane to reduce signal dropout in the orbitofrontal area 
(Deichmann et al., 2003). After the four functional sessions, high-resolution (1 mm3) anatomical 
images were acquired using a standard MPRAGE pulse sequence (TR = 1500 ms, TE = 2.63 ms, 
FA = 10°). 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Preprocessing. We used the SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
Institute of Neurology, London) for image processing and statistical analysis. fMRI images for 
each participant were preprocessed using the standard procedure in SPM8: after slice timing 
correction, the images were realigned to the first volume to correct for participants’ motion, 
spatially normalized, and spatially smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. High-pass 
temporal filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) was also applied to the data. 
General linear model I. A separate general linear model (GLM) was defined for each 
participant. The GLM contained parametric regressors representing the three key computational 
variables at the onset of decision (Figure 1B): the participant’s preference for the chosen item, 
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the percentage of group-members who had previously selected the item that was chosen by the 
participant on the current trial, and the estimated stickiness of the chosen item.  
Specifically, the participant-specific design matrices contained the following 
regressors: (1) two stick functions at the onset of decision phase separately for four-person and 
six-person blocks, and two boxcar functions in the period of the decision phase for four-person 
and six-person blocks; (2) two stick functions at the timing of motor response for four-person 
and six-person blocks; (3) two stick functions at the onset of outcome phase, and two boxcar 
functions in the period of the phase; and (4) two stick functions at the onset of instruction phase, 
and two boxcar functions in the period of the phase. We also included the parametric 
modulators of the stick functions at the onset of decision for four-person and six-person blocks, 
encoding the participant’s preference for the chosen item, the percentage of group-members 
who had previously selected the item that was chosen by the participant on the current trial, and 
the estimated stickiness of the chosen item, respectively. Furthermore, to control for nuisance 
effects of outcome-related neural signals, we included two parametric modulators at the onset of 
outcome: the group members’ current choice (the percentage of group-members who chose the 
same item as the participant did), and the prediction error about the stickiness (posterior minus 
prior mean of the stickiness for the chosen item). All the regressors were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function. In addition, six motion-correction parameters were 
included as regressors of no-interest to account for motion-related artifacts. Notably, in the 
model specification procedure, we concatenated four sessions into one GLM because of the 
small number of trials in each session (note: constant regressors coding for each session were 
included); and serial orthogonalization of parametric modulators was turned off. 
Supplemental Information: Human consensus decision-making 
 
We defined contrasts of interest for the three key computational variables at the time 
of decision, independent of group size, as a [1 1] contrast of corresponding regressors for 
four-person and six-person blocks. For each participant, the contrasts were estimated at every 
voxel of the whole-brain and entered into a random-effects analysis.  
General linear model II. The GLM contained parametric regressors representing the choice 
probability assigned by the computational model to the participant’s chosen item at the onset of 
decision phase for four-person and six-person blocks, in addition to the regressors included in 
GLM I. Note that the choice probability regressors were orthogonalized to the other parametric 
regressors at the same timing. 
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. The PPI analysis was performed by the 
standard procedure in SPM8. We first extract BOLD signals from independent ROIs (see 
below): vmPFC, right pSTS/TPJ and bilateral IPS (combination of the right and left IPS 
regions); and then created PPI regressors by forming interactions of the BOLD signals 
(physiological factors) and the stick function regressors at the onset of decision phase for 
four-person and six-person blocks (psychological factors). The GLM for the PPI analysis 
therefore contained the following regressors: (1) physiological factors, BOLD signals from the 
three ROIs; (2) psychological factors, the stick function regressors at the onset of decision phase 
for four-person and six-person blocks; and (3) PPI factors, interaction terms of the 
psychological and physiological factors, as well as the other regressors included in GLM I. 
Whole-brain analysis. We set our significance threshold at p < 0.05 whole-brain corrected for 
multiple comparisons at cluster-level. The minimum spatial extent, k = 63, for the threshold was 
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estimated based on the underlying voxel-wise p-value, p < 0.005 uncorrected, by using the 
AlphaSim program in Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) (Cox, 1996). 
ROI analysis. ROI analyses were performed by the Marsbar software. Each ROI or 
small-volume was defined as a 10mm sphere centered on the coordinates extracted from the 
prior studies on social and non-social decision-making. For vmPFC (Figure 4), we used the 
coordinates [-5 37 -10] extracted from a meta-analysis (Clithero and Rangel, 2013); for 
pSTS/TPJ (Figure 5), we used the coordinates [55 -45 13] which are the average co-ordinates 
extracted from the four most relevant computational studies of STS/TPJ function (Behrens et al., 
2008; Boorman et al., 2013; Hampton et al., 2008; Haruno and Kawato, 2009); for right and left 
IPS (Figure 6), we used the coordinates [41 -51 39] and [-37 -56 42] which are averaged 
co-ordinates extracted from the five most relevant prior computational fMRI studies involving 
the IPS (d'Acremont et al., 2013; Daw et al., 2006; Glascher et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011; 
Suzuki et al., 2012). 
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